Econometric Models of Insurance under Asymmetric Information

By Pierre-Andre Chiappori. 2000

181 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2305d1f28e1cd3020d2a4b34c8177d9d1eb49372

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets (2000, background): “Our basic claim, following Chiappori (1994), is that the theoretical notion of asymmetric information (whether adverse selection or ex ante moral hazard) implies, in statistical terms, a positive correlation between two (conditional) distributions.”
Securitization is Not that Evil after All (2011, unknown): “As pointed out by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) in the case of the insurance market the choice of whether to get full coverage or not could also be determined by totally different factors (say, preferences or risk aversion) that, by coincidence, turn out to be positively correlated with risk.”
SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE: Separating Moral Hazard (2013, background): “E( nijdi0; ni0; bi0;xi) = n;ddi0 + n;nni0 + n;bbi0 (6)”
Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market (2006, unknown): “Rows (2) and (10) add risk tolerance alone to the regression (16).”
The (1992) Bonus‐Malus System in Tunisia: An Empirical Evaluation (2005, unknown): “Chiappori (2000) presented an original review of the literature on empirical verification models on the presence of information problems in insurance markets.”
Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: Can dynamic data help to distinguish? (2003, background): “3For a review of various attempts to distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection, see Chiappori (2000).”
Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market. (2006, background): “Several recent studies in different insurance markets, however, have found no evidence to support the central prediction of many asymmetric information models that those with more insurance should be more likely to experience the insured risk.”
Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data (2003, methodology): “A possible solution, used by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) in their cross-sectional analysis, is to consider exclusively accidents in which a second party was involved (in which case a claim is almost automatically filed).”