Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market

By Hanming Fang, Michael P. Keane, Dan Silverman. Journal of Political Economy, 2006

447 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/42774ba184255d9c2ee6f5a4463af607d72f5433

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. M. Polyakova
2. Armenak Antinyan
3. Zareh Asatryan

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Benjamin R. Handel
2. M. Polyakova
3. Armenak Antinyan
4. Zareh Asatryan

In General Health Professions

1. Armenak Antinyan
2. M. Polyakova
3. Zareh Asatryan

Citations in the corpus

• Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets (2010, unknown): “” Fang et al. (2008) show that US senior citizens who purchase Medigap insurance (a supplement to Medicare) spend roughly $4,000 per year less on health care than those who do not purchase such policies.”
• Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts. (2013, background): “We divide claims into these four specific categories so that we can accurately characterize the plan-specific mappings from total claims to out-of-pocket expenditures since each of these categories maps to out-of-pocket expenditures in a different manner.”