Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market.

By Amy N. Finkelstein, K. Mcgarry. The American Economic Review, 2006

598 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b279e061c839912296c67fb621ab5e6cd3d731ad

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Citations in the corpus

Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications (2006, background): “15 Using subjective assessments by insurees, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find evidence for such a model in long-term care insurance.”
Incidental Bequests: Bequest Motives and the Choice to Self-Insure Late-Life Risks (2014, background): “In long-term care, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find that average long-term care usage is roughly equal for the insured and uninsured population, though Finkelstein et al.”
Observing unobservables: Identifying information asymmetries with a consumer credit field experiment (2005, unknown): “This is an empirically important point, since asymmetric information problems may produce inefficiencies even when they cancel out on net (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).”
Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D (2015, unknown): “In practice, the literature does not always find evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), which suggests that the presence of selection is ultimately an empirical question. In this section, I document novel empirical evidence for the presence of adverse sel”
Knowledge of Future Job Loss and Implications for Unemployment Insurance (2017, unknown): “The data contain a very rich set of observable characteristics that wellapproximate variables used by insurance companies in disability, long-term care, and life insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry (2006); He (2009); Hendren (2013)) and also contain a variety of variables well-suited for controlling ”
Nonlinear Pricing with Product Customization in Mobile Service Industry (2011, unknown): “See, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Cohen and Einav (2007).”
Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data (2012, background): “And indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that heterogeneity in risk aversion may be as or more important than heterogeneity in risk type in explaining patterns of insurance demand in automobile insurance (Cohen and Einav 2007) and in long-term care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006).”