Adverse selection and moral hazard in insurance: Can dynamic data help to distinguish?

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Are Risk Preferences Stable Across Contexts? Evidence from Insurance Data (2011, methodology): “Recently, a handful of papers separately test for moral hazard in longitudinal auto insurance data using a dynamic approach pioneered by Japp H. Abbring, Chiappori, and Jean Pinquet (2003) and Abbring et al. (2003).”
Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market (2006, unknown): “8 Unfortunately, the waves of the MCBS data used in Khandker and McCormack’s (1999) analysis did not contain information about out-of-pocket costs as well as expenses paid by supplementary insurers.”
Socio-Economic Studies on Suicide: A Survey (2012, unknown): “To further distinguish between the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard on suicides, dynamic data on individual life insurance contracts may be needed (Abbring et al., 2003).”
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets (2018, background): “See Abbring et al. (2003) for distinguishing between those sources of asymmetric information.”
The Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market (2007, unknown): “…or when employers change the menu of health insurance plans from which their employees can choose.24 Non-linear experience rating schemes may also introduce useful variation in the incentive e¤ects of insurance policies (Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet, 2003a; Abbring et al., 2003b; Israel, 2004).”