Design and Implementation of a TCG-based Integrity Measurement Architecture

By R. Sailer, Xiaolan Zhang, T. Jaeger, Leendert van Doorn. 2004

1,216 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Pinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation (2013, background): “For example, systems based on replication [1, 7, 8] assume uncorrelated failures, while those based on Trusted Computing [9–11] or other secure hardware [12–15] assume that physical protections cannot be defeated.”
Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems (2005, methodology): “Sailer et al. describe a loadtime attestation technique that relies on the TPM chip standardized by the Trusted Computing Group [20].”
A minimalist approach to Remote Attestation (2014, background): “The adversary could modify Attest after it is loaded into RAM, but before it is executed [26].”
ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks (2014, background): “…Zhou§, Miao Yu§, Xuhua Ding†, Robert H. Deng† † School of Information Systems, Singapore Management University † {yqcheng.2008, xhding, robertdeng}@smu.edu.sg § ECE Department and CyLab, Carnegie Mellon University § {stephenzhou, superymk}@cmu.edu Abstract—Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a…”
vTPM: Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module (2006, methodology): “The server-side driver runs in the virtual machine hosting the vTPM.”
CloudVisor: retrofitting protection of virtual machines in multi-tenant cloud with nested virtualization (2011, methodology): “The verification procedure is similar to the remote attestation procedure between CloudVisor and the cloud user, which is a standard remote attestation protocol from TCG [52].”
TrustVisor: Efficient TCB Reduction and Attestation (2010, background): “Other researchers have considered systems for remote attestation [3, 14, 28], but these systems all depend on an unbroken chain of measurement and trust, starting from boot.”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, methodology): “The original approach to TPM-based attes-tation builds a chain of trust using progressive measurement of code during system boot, such as the bootloader, OS, etc. [50].”
ROPdefender: a detection tool to defend against return-oriented programming attacks (2011, methodology): “For instance, the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [36] uses a TPM to record measurements of any dynamic executable content at load-time from the BIOS all the way up to the application layer.”
Building a MAC-based security architecture for the Xen open-source hypervisor (2005, methodology): “To this end, we are experimenting with establishing this trust based on the Trusted Computing Group’s Trusted Platform Module [1] and the related Integrity Measurement Architecture [28].”
Automated detection of persistent kernel control-flow attacks (2007, methodology): “Unlike attestation-based techniques [18, 13, 30, 27, 28, 31], which measure code and data at load time, Pioneer is capable of running arbitrary procedures in a trusted manner.”
Resolving the conflict between generality and plausibility in verified computation (2013, methodology): “Provided one is willing to batch veri.cation, we develop a protocol that achieves the ef.ciency of the best manually constructed protocols in the literature yet applies to most computations.”
Formal Abstractions for Attested Execution Secure Processors (2017, background): “Numerous works have demonstrated how to apply trusted hardware to design secure cloud systems [11, 28, 50, 61, 62], cryptocurrency systems [74], collaborative data analytics applications [55], and others [12, 23, 59, 63].”