Pioneer: verifying code integrity and enforcing untampered code execution on legacy systems

By Arvind Seshadri, Mark Luk, Adrian Perrig, Leendert van Doorn, Pradeep K. Khosla. 2005

501 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Signal Processing

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

In Signal Processing

Citations in the corpus

Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2019, methodology): “While TEEs enable hardware-based remote attestations, both software-based remote attestions [351] and hybrid remote attestation designs [152, 238] were proposed in the literature and enable to trade off hardware requirements for verifiability.”
HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity (2010, background): “They have been leveraged to provide secure loading (with the guaranteed load-time integrity) [49], [32], integrity measurement [39], [22], and attestation [41], [42], [45].”
SMART: Secure and Minimal Architecture for (Establishing a Dynamic) Root of Trust (2012, methodology): “Several software-based attestation methods have been proposed for commodity [37] and embedded”
Accountable Virtual Machines (2010, methodology): “Pioneer [36] can detect such modifications using only software, but it relies on recognizing sub-millisecond delay variations, which restricts its use to small networks.”
Guest-Transparent Prevention of Kernel Rootkits with VMM-Based Memory Shadowing (2008, background): “There have been a number of recent efforts in mitigating the threat of kernel rootkits and they can be classified into two main categories: (1) detecting the presence of kernel rootkits in a system [3, 23, 25, 32, 33, 42, 47] and (2) preventing the compromise of OS kernel integrity [19, 41].”
Security and privacy challenges in industrial Internet of Things (2015, background): “Since malicious software on the prover’s platform could forge this report, its authenticity is typically assured by secure hardware [49, 67, 48, 14, 29, 56, 26] and/or trusted software [3, 24, 60, 59, 58, 57, 16, 32, 29, 68].”
C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software (2016, background): “Pioneer: Verifying Code Integrity and Enforcing Untampered Code Execution on Legacy Systems.”
Automated detection of persistent kernel control-flow attacks (2007, methodology): “propose Pioneer, a technique for running trusted software on an untrusted system in a verifiable way (“verifiable code execution”) [29].”
SMART: Secure and Minimal Architecture for (Establishing Dynamic) Root of Trust (2012, methodology): “Several software-based attestation methods have been proposed for commodity [37] and embedded devices [38] [36] [25] [35] [47].”