ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks

By Yueqiang Cheng, Zongwei Zhou, Miao Yu, Xuhua Ding, Robert Huijie Deng. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2014

328 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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ROP is Still Dangerous: Breaking Modern Defenses (2014, methodology): “We use these attacks to break two recent state-of-theart runtime defenses, kBouncer [23] and ROPecker [11].”
Stitching the Gadgets: On the Ineffectiveness of Coarse-Grained Control-Flow Integrity Protection (2014, background): “To do so, we introduce several new ROP attack primitives, and demonstrate the practicality of our approach by transforming existing real-world exploits into more stealthy attacks that bypass coarse-grained CFI defenses.”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, methodology): “To reduce this overhead, a number of proposals have been made: kBouncer [92], ROPecker [93], CFI for COTS binaries [94], ROPGuard [95], and CCFIR [96].”
Control-Flow Bending: On the Effectiveness of Control-Flow Integrity (2015, methodology): “This notion of fully-precise static CFI allows us to transcend the recent arms race caused by defenders proposing forms of CFI [9,28] and then attackers defeating them [5, 14, 16].”
Control-Flow Integrity (2017, background): “There have also been efforts to repurpose existing hardware mechanisms to implement CFI [Cheng et al. 2014; Pappas et al. 2013; van der Veen et al. 2015; Yuan et al. 2015].”
Hypervision Across Worlds: Real-time Kernel Protection from the ARM TrustZone Secure World (2014, methodology): “Completely eliminating these attacks requires orthogonal techniques, such as [17,19,21,57].”