Individual Differences and the Belief Bias Effect: Mental Models, Logical Necessity, and Abstract Reasoning
By D. Torrens. 1999
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Wim De Neys
- Ruth M. J. Byrne
- Eva Derous
- Alexander Buijsrogge
- Nicolas Roulin
- Wouter Duyck
- Jonathan Evans
Citations in the corpus
- Automatic-heuristic and executive-analytic processing during reasoning: Chronometric and dual-task considerations. (2006, background): “Stanovich and West found that participants higher in cognitive capacity (as assessed by standard cognitive ability tests) were indeed more likely to give the correct normative response (see also Klaczynski, 2001; Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004; Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999”
- On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning (2007, background): “Some belief bias data are consistent with the quality hypothesis, as they show both that (a) people with higher ability find more logically correct answers on belief laden problems and (b) the same people have measured levels of belief bias that are no less than low-ability participants (Newstead et”
- Why your stigma isn't hired : a dual-process framework of interview bias (2016, methodology): “Answers by the applicant, both confirming and disconfirming, are interpreted and used to update the model or representation of the applicant (Evans, 2006; Torrens, 1999).”
- Reasoning counterfactually: making inferences about things that didn't happen. (2002, background): “Yet there are clear indications in the existing literature that individuals may differ in various ways ( Torrens, Thompson, & Cramer, 1999 ), including in their interpretation of conditionals as biconditionals or conditionals proper (e.g., Markovits, 1984) and in their development and use of differe”