Does Family Control Matter? International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis
By K. Lins, Paolo F. Volpin, Hannes F. Wagner. 2013
363 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1dbff4f5e7bbe6f4560a49023587c276282661b0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- W. Schulze
- Jeroen Neckebrouck
- Sascha Kraus
- O. Shapir
- Rodrigo Zeidan
- Pingshu Li
- M. Breier
In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
- Thomas M. Zellweger
- W. Schulze
- Jeroen Neckebrouck
- Sascha Kraus
- M. Breier
- M. Deloof
- Johanna Gast
- Thomas Clauss
Citations in the corpus
- Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence (2018, neutral): “6 The fraction of family firms in our dataset is smaller than in the dataset of Faccio and Lang (2002) (for European firms) and of Stijn, Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) (for Asian firms), but larger than in the dataset used by Lins et al. (2013).”
- The economics of COVID-19: initial empirical evidence on how family firms in five European countries cope with the corona crisis (2020, background): “Family firms sacrifice short-term performance and shareholder value for long-term survival (Lins et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2016) and thus may also utilize specific measures in response to crises.”
- Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance: The Value of Corporate Social Responsibility during the Financial Crisis: Social Capital, Trust, and Firm Performance (2017, neutral): “Recent evidence shows that better-governed firms performed relatively well in the financial crisis (Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) and Nguyen, Nguyen, and Yin (2015)).”
- Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, neutral): “…empirical evidence shows that family owners of such firms may divert cash to serve their own liquidity needs or projects of private interest (e.g. Lins et al., 2013, Betrand et al., 2002) Many of such powerful families often form close ties with the Government to pursue rent seeking activities…”
- The value of government ownership during the global financial crisis (2017, background): “Government Ownership and Stock Returns during the Crisis Following a large body of research that has used cumulative stock returns during a crisis as a measure of the change in value during a financial crisis (e.g., Mitton, 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, Volpin, and Wagner, 2013), we first consi”
- Dividends and economic policy uncertainty: International evidence (2021, neutral): “To the extent that agency costs are more pronounced during times of crisis (e.g., Bae et al., 2012; Lins et al., 2013; Mitton, 2002), the monitoring benefits of dividends are expected to be more pronounced under greater uncertainty.”
- ESG Ratings and Stock Performance during the COVID-19 Crisis (2021, background): “[43] and Petersen [44] since firm controls might be correlated between firms within the respective country.”
- Cash Conversion Cycle and Value-Enhancing Operations: Theory and Evidence for a Free Lunch (2017, background): “Lins et al. (2013) show that family-owned firms experienced severe liquidity shocks following the financial crisis that started in 2007.”
- Do employee-friendly firms invest more efficiently? Evidence from labor investment efficiency (2020, neutral): “Several previous studies (Bharath et al., 2013; Buchanan et al., 2018; Lins et al., 2017, 2013) use the 2008-2009 financial crisis as an exogenous shock to firms.”
- Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic (2020, neutral): “804 gies employed by hedge funds and their reliance on leverage can contribute to sharp, nonfundamental price movements in response to adverse shocks and with research by Pastor and Vorsatz (2020) and Glossner et al.”
- Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “For example, La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) and Lins, Volpin, and Wagner (2013) identify a variety of practices that allow family members to extract dividends and perquisites from firms they control in amounts that exceed their cash flow rights, and document that such practices are…”