What Trade-off of Risk and Incentives?

By Canice Prendergast. 2000

205 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/181daa021e4883d875368ad5fbea94ee59d0c6c1

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Citations in the corpus

Uncertainty and Incentives (2002, background): “There are other reasons why incentives may be more intense in uncertain settings, and these are described in more detail in Prendergast (2000).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “Core and Guay (2001b) reconcile these competing findings and show an increasing relation between risk and incentives as predicted by Prendergast (2000), Core and Qian (2001), and Raith (2001).”
The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms (2003, background): “4 Prendergast (2000) provides additional reasons for a positive link between risk and incentives that emphasize the increased use of incentives to compensate for the difficulty in monitoring in uncertain environments.”
Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives (2003, unknown): “As Prendergast (1999, 2000a, 2000b) points out, however , empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between risk and incentives is scarce.”
CEO Equity Incentives and Audit Fees (2015, background): “For example, firms with relatively high uncertainty may use more equity compensation because monitoring of managers is more costly in these firms (Prendergast 2000, 2002).”
Performance Pay, Risk Attitudes and Job Satisfaction (2008, unknown): “Received 12 January 2010 Received in revised form 21 September 2010 Accepted 29 September 2010 Available online 8 October 2010 JEL classification: D80 J24 J28 J33 M52”
Theories of the Firm-Market Boundary (2011, unknown): “For instance, principal-agent models offer advice on how to align the interests and incentives of actors within the firm (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991, 1994 ; Prendergast, 2000 ; also see Eisenhardt, 1989 ).”
Human Resource Management and Productivity (2010, unknown): “Brown (1990) examining a wider range of occupations also finds little relationship between incentive pay and the riskiness of the environment, Prendergast (2000, 2002a, 2002b) looks at this evidence in more detail and offers several possible explanations.”
Committee Independence and Financial Institution Performance During the 2007–08 Credit Crunch: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study (2011, background): “Prendergast (2000), Raheja (2005), and Brick and Chidambaran (2008) find a negative relationship between board monitoring and firm risk, and the monitoring is more crucial in uncertain environments.”
Contracts, Extracontractual Incentives, and Ex Post Behavior in Franchise Channel Relationships (2012, background): “First, making payments contingent on the performance of specific tasks or the achievement of specific outcomes requires verification of task performance or outcome achievement (Prendergast 2000), and corrective action must be taken as necessary.”
The Role of Stock Liquidity in Executive Compensation (2012, unknown): “Prendergast (2000; 2002) argues that firms rely more on stock-based incentives in riskier environments where it is more difficult to monitor the manager’s actions.”