The Role of Stock Liquidity in Executive Compensation

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Stock Liquidity and Stock Price Crash Risk (2016, background): “…studies document that stock liquidity reduces stock mispricing (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008), Boehmer and Kelley (2009)), increases the use of equity-based compensation (Jayaraman and Milbourn (2012)), and reduces reliance on board independence (Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)).”
The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “For example, Jayaraman and Milbourn (2012) find that liquidity positively affects managerial incentives.”
A Comparison of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity in Privately-Held and Public Firms (2015, background): “On the other hand, the greater separation of ownership and control, along with the free-rider problem from highly liquid dispersed ownership, significantly decreases shareholder monitoring in public firms (Grossman and Hart (1980), Jensen (1989), and Bhide (1993)).”
The Real Effects of Financial Markets (2012, unknown): “Jayaraman and Milbourn (2011) demonstrate that CEO incentives are increasing in liquidity, using stock splits as an instrument for liquidity.”
A simple approximation of intraday spreads using daily data (2014, background): “…and Yan, 2009), (4) firm value (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009), (5) corporate governance (Chung, Elder, and Kim, 2010), (6) executive compensation (Jayaraman and Milbourn, 2012), (7) corporate innovation (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2013), (8) institutional investors' stock selection decisions…”