Competition, Risk and Managerial Incentives

By Michael Raith. 2003

796 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/894f41938ee53bd579f11e0bbff6df12272ee8ee

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Citations in the corpus

Competition and the Cost of Debt (2012, neutral): “This conjecture is consistent with recent theory and empirical evidence that show that competition increases idiosyncratic stock and cash flow volatility (Raith, 2003; Gaspar and Massa, 2006; Irvine and Pontiff, 2009).”
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Firm Productivity and Innovation (2018, neutral): “” Managers responsible for choosing how much to innovate may not make the choice that maximizes their firms’ profits when they draw private benefits simply from their firm’s continued existence (Hart 1983; Schmidt 1997; Vives 2008; Raith 2003).”
Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (2016, methodology): “Theoretical papers that examine the relationship between (i) product market competition and (ii) managerial incentives include Hart (1983), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Scharfstein (1988), Hermalin (1992), Fumas (1992), Schmidt (1997), Meyer and Vickers (1997), Raith (2003), Vives (200”
Globalization and the Provision of Incentives inside the Firm: The Effect of Foreign Competition (2009, neutral): “Marin and Verdier (2003a and 2003b) argue that increased globalization and international trade lead firms to demand more talent (to a "war for talent") as the market becomes more competitive, and to the extent that talent is in limited supply.”
Market Structure and Productivity: A Concrete Example (2004, neutral): “Recent examples include Aghion and Howitt (1992), Nickell (1996), Melitz (2003), Raith (2003), and Schmitz (2004).”
Determinants and Effects of Subjectivity in Incentives (2004, positive): “Assigning bonuses subjectively can help accomplish both objectives, and this will be useful in more unpredictable and competitive environments (Raith 2001).”
A Darker Side to Decentralized Banks: Market Power and Credit Rationing in SME Lending (2012, background): “This implication is also related to other work looking a the importance of examining organizational structure within the context of the institutional environment and not treating it in isolation (e.g. Raith 2003).”
Investment, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Ownership (2011, neutral): “In addition, a number of theoretical papers examine the effect of product market competition on managerial incentives [Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003].”
The Effects of Market Competition, Capital Structure, and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Mediation Analysis by Incorporating the GMM Model Technique (2020, background): “Empirical studies argue that product market competition leads to better performance because it serves as a powerful force to solve agency conflicts between owners and managers, which leads to improved firm profitability [68,69].”
Corporate Governance and the Dynamics of Capital Structure: New Evidence (2014, positive): “…have therefore attempted to formalize the idea that product market competition acts an important role in reducing a ﬁrm’s agency conﬂicts between managers and share-holders (e.g., Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958; Fama, 1980; Winston, 1998; Kole and Lehn, 1997, 1999; Raith, 2003; Karuna, 2008).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, positive): “Core and Guay (2001b) reconcile these competing findings and show an increasing relation between risk and incentives as predicted by Prendergast (2000), Core and Qian (2001), and Raith (2001).”
Import competition and firm innovation: Evidence from China (2021, background): “Alternatively, the preference argument suggests that less productive firms may provide incentives to managers to survive in an environment of competition with their rivals (Raith 2003).”
Management practices across firms and nations (2005, background): “In the context of this simple model (which follows Raith, 2003), once we allow for endogenous market structure an increase in product market competition unambiguously increases good management practices5.”