Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

By Michael Firth, P. M. Fung, Oliver M. Rui. 2006

658 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/12b1ab03d55f60d7ed0fad11d1e3633e1c8eca04

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Citations in the corpus

Can Book-Tax Differences Capture Earnings Management and Tax Management? Empirical Evidence from China (2011, neutral): “18 and the managers’ compensations do not relate to stock returns, which suggests that managers may have more incentives to act in the best interests of the state rather than in the best interest of public shareholders (Firth et al., 2006).”
Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “Even worse, the state is playing two roles at the same time — the controlling shareholder and the regulator (see Clarke, 2003; Firth et al., 2006 for a discussion of the state agency being the majority shareholder in China).”
The Impact of State Ownership on Share Price Informativeness: The Case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China (2012, background): “The region classification is based on Firth et al. (2006), 44 which groups firms into four regions based on the levels of economic development: 1.”
Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, neutral): “Firth et al. (2006) find that firms owned by private blockholders link the CEO’s pay to stock and accounting performance.”
State Control and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: 25 Years on from 1989 (2016, neutral): “The legacy of communism constrained CEO pay in the early stages of economic reforms (Firth et al., 2006) and there is generally a relatively small pay gap between organization levels in SOEs (Chen,”
Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies (2008, methodology): “The rate of CEO turnover is much higher than normal; Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006b) calculate the normal turnover rate for Chinese firms to be 34% (and this rate is quite high by international standards).”
Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China (2010, background): “…classifies owners of nontradable shares primarily into 2 categories (state (STATE) shares and legal-person (LP) shares) in favor of classifications based upon the identity of the ultimate owner (Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006), Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2007), (2009), and Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009)).”
Controlling shareholders' tunneling and executive compensation: Evidence from China (2011, background): “(Firth et al., 2006).”
CEO gender, executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese‐listed enterprises (2013, background): “In relation to Chinese managerial turnover, Firth et al. (2006b) find that earnings-based returns provide the most reliable indicators.”
Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, positive): “Following Firth et al. (2006), we exclude all financial services firms.”