The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origin and Growth of Firms

By Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales. 2000

566 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d89c0b5a4953bd15dae1177d65a0bd71d07e2fd

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Citations in the corpus

When Do Employees Become Entrepreneurs? (2007, unknown): “Rajan and Zingales (2002) examine how the threat of employee departures affects firm's hiring decisions.”
Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies (2009, background): “Zingales (2000) and Rajan and Zingales (2001b) argue that today’s “new firms” differ from the traditional firms of the early 20th century in that specific human capital has become more important.”
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment (2011, background): “Allowing employees to depart from companies at will discourages employers from making investments in their workers (for example, in the form of training) and reduces the probability that employees will be made privy to firm secrets or strategies (Rajan and Zingales, 2001).”
Are Elite Universities Losing Their Competitive Edge (2009, background): “When physical proximity is required for spillover, firms exercise authority over their employees by controlling access to the physical premises ( Rajan and Zingales, 1998, 2001 ).”
Attracting Early Stage Investors: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment (2015, unknown): “…of non-human assets at the core of the firm, whereas the contrasting view puts the human assets of the firm at its core (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984; Rajan and Zingales 1998, 2001; Rajan 2012).4 Our results present evidence of the importance of human capital assets at the earliest 3 Closed…”
Slack Resources and the Rent-Generating Potential of Firm-Specific Knowledge (2016, background): “Although the firm also relies on its knowledge employees with specialized investments (Rajan & Zingales, 2001), it is generally the case that employees are in a more disadvantaged bargaining position and thus are more vulnerable to the firm’s opportunistic behavior.”
Towards a Political Theory of the Firm (2017, background): “While it focuses only on the market power arising from past investments, this link also holds when the source of market power is economies of scale, network externalities, or government-granted licenses (Rajan and Zingales 2001).”
Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management (2005, background): “…MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), Maskin and Moore (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999a,b), Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001), Muller and Warneryd (2001), Noldke and Schmidt (1995), Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2001), Segal (1999), Tirole (1999), Yang and Ng (1995), Whinston (2001) and Williamson (2000).”
Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm (2005, background): “Blair and Stout (1999), along the lines of Rajan and Zingales (2001), go beyond the team production model of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) by considering that numerous corporate stakeholders may make firmspecific investments and that a ''mediating hierarchy solution'' requires team members, in their…”
Organizations and Trade (2009, methodology): “A more satisfactory approach would entail the application of the property-rights approach and of the notion of access developed by Rajan and Zingales (2001).”
Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy (2006, background): “A third strand (Rajan and Zingales, 2001) studies the role of hierarchies in administering access to core resources. Finally, Garicano (2000) studies hierarchies’ role in knowledge acquisition.”