Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms

By Manohar Singh, W. Davidson. 2003

865 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0d747ff88a5d861eac33bca8c9e35b0e0e9ba8b1

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from the Insurance Sector of Ghana (2012, background): “Nevertheless, other researchers (Park and Shin, 2003; Singh and Davidson, 2003) could not established any relationship.”
The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial Performance in Nigeria (2010, background): “This follows from the argument that regulation masks the efficiency differences across firms, potentially rendering governance mechanisms less important (Vafeas and Theorodou, 1998; Singh and Davidson, 2003).”
The Impacts of Free Cash Flows and Agency Costs on Firm Performance (2010, background): “More studies supporting the effect of firm size could be seen in Gul and Tsui [19], Grullon and Michaely [36], and Singh and Davidson [26].”
The effect of board size and composition on European bank performance (2007, neutral): “reducing agency costs (Singh and Davidson (2003)).”
Agency theory and managerial ownership: evidence from Malaysia (2011, result): “However, there are also studies, which suggest contradictory and mixed findings such as Singh and Davidson (2003)”
Women on board, firm financial performance and agency costs (2012, neutral): “This finding is in line with Singh and Davidson (2003) who find a significant positive relationship for leverage in their study of larger companies.”
Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance compliance: A private contracting perspective (2010, background): “Singh and Davidson (2003) found that larger managerial ownership and smaller-sized boards both enhanced asset utilisation ratios for large listed US companies.”
Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement (2006, neutral): “…data 1 For examples of papers on these listed topics, see Denis et al. (1997), Ryan and Wiggins (2001), Anderson et al. (2000), Ang et al. (2000), Singh and Davidson (2003), Heflin and Shaw (2000), Field and Sheehan (2004), Denis and Denis (1994), Cremers and Nair (in press), Bhagat et al.…”
Female board directorship and firm performance: What really matters? (2018, background): “Fe- ale directors who are independent or have business expertise re more concerned about finding solutions to the situation of onsiderable agency conflict, such as that of lower asset turnover Singh and Davidson, 2003 ) than about improving incomes and/or educing costs.”
Ownership, independent directors, agency costs and financial distress: evidence from Chinese listed companies (2008, background): “Considering job perks cause shrink in company resources and higher management discretion, to a large extent, suggests greater agency conflicts ( Singh and Davidson, 2003”
Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: A Study of New Zealand Listed-Firms (2012, background): “Furthermore, Singh and Davidson (2003) find no evidence that blockholders' ownership affects agency costs.”
Ownership Structure and Intellectual Capital Performance in Malaysia (2009, positive): “…& Subramanyam, 1998; Bartov, Givoly & Hayn, 2002), managerial ownership (Warfield, Wild & Wild, 1995), block ownership (Peasnell, Pope & Young, 2000; Yeo, Tan, Ho & Chen, 2002; Jung & Kwon, 2002; Singh & Davidson, 2003) and audit committee (Klein, 2002), may significantly reduce the agency costs.”
Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives (2017, methodology): “11 Singh and Davidson 2003 USA 118 US-listed firms Smaller board size increases the asset utilisation ratio.”