Teleological reasoning in infancy: the nai;ve theory of rational action.

By György Gergely, Gergely Csibra. 2003

986 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Education, Social Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Theory of Mind: A Neural Prediction Problem (2013, neutral): “The same action may therefore be predicted, or unpredicted, depending on the individual’s goals and the environmental constraints (Gergely and Csibra, 2003).”
The Five “A”s of Meaning Maintenance: Finding Meaning in the Theories of Sense-Making (2012, background): “Or present us with seemingly sentient beings that behave in ways that no sentient being should behave (Gergely & Csibra, 2003).”
Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants. (2008, background): “This result demonstrates not just that 6.5-month-olds attribute goals to agents in a 3D environment on the basis of the efficiency principle (Gergely & Csibra, 2003), but also that they do not restrict this kind of attribution to humans or familiar agents.”
A Conceptual Guide to Natural History Museum Visitors’ Understanding of Evolution (2009, positive): “However, based on research with infants (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Woodward, 2009), we argue that this is not necessarily the case.”
Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing (2017, background): “First, our inferences tacitly assume that the agent under observation is approximately rational 28 — that their behaviour will use efficient means to achieve their desires while minimizing costs incurred, subject to their beliefs about the world, which are rational functions of their prior…”
On the nature and origin of intuitive theories : learning, physics and psychology (2015, background): “Infants are also sensitive to self-propelled motion [146, 132], efficient movement towards goals given possible actions, and social responsiveness [33, 52].”
Learning From Others (2012, positive): “…than random (Bruner, 1966; Vygotsky, 1978) and that observed data are often the consequence of goal-directed actions (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) or of intentional communication or teaching (Coady, 1992; Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Harris, 2002;…”
Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition (2005, background): “Gergely and Csibra (2003) have proposed that human infants possess an action-interpretation system that perceives humanlike action as teleologically directed to a goal from the second half of the first year of life; independently developing is a reference-interpretation system concerned with…”
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? (2009, background): “Thus , our account has substantial explanatory power beyond the account of Gergely and Csibra ( 2003 ) .”
What is mentalization? The concept and its foundations in developmental research (2012, background): “Infants expect actors to behave rationally, given physically apparent goal states and the physical constraints of the situation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003).”
Cross-species variation in gaze following and conspecific preference among great apes, human infants and adults (2014, neutral): “One could hypothesize that human infants may follow both human and nonhuman gaze because previous studies have shown that human infants find goal directedness in nonhuman agents if the agents show certain type of behavioural cues (e.g. self-propelling; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).”
What's worth the effort: Ten-month-old infants infer the value of goals from the costs of actions (2017, positive): “…psychology: Do infants’ capacities testify to distinct local abilities (Heyes & Frith, 2014; Paulus, 2012; Woodward, 2009), or to a single coherent system supporting inference, prediction, and learning (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Carey, 2009; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007)?”
The Naïve Utility Calculus: Computational Principles Underlying Commonsense Psychology. (2016, background): “Theses inferences have been explained by the hypothesis that infants adopt a “teleological stance” [3], a non-mentalistic representation of behavior where agents are assumed to move efficiently towards goal-states, subject to situational constraints.”