Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

By Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, J. Call, Tanya Behne, Henrike Moll. 2005

4,112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Science & Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Neural Theory-of-Mind? On the Limits of Social Intelligence in Large LMs (2022, background): “primarily learned (Wells and Bridges, 1981; Tomasello et al., 2005) and used (Clark, 1996) in collaborative and interactive settings (Clark and Schaefer, 1989), which allow interlocutors to give immediate feedback to each other on whether their”
Generating Legible Motion (2013, background): “We have a universal tendency to interpret each other’s actions as intentional and goal-directed [4, 6, 10, 11, 25, 31, 37], and our ability to communicate our intentions plays a crucial role in our collaborations [34].”
The gap is social: Human shared intentionality and culture (2010, background): “However, as in previous theoretical work (Tomasello et al. 2005), here, we want to single out for special attention “shared cooperative activities” – a subtype in which humans routinely engage.”
Towards a unified science of cultural evolution. (2006, background): “Although the widespread use of symbolic language does seem to be specific to humans, a capacity to use symbols and attribute intentions and meanings is to some extent shared with other species (Tomasello et al. 2005).”
How to learn about teaching: An evolutionary framework for the study of teaching behavior in humans and other animals. (2014, methodology): “For example, models may use gaze to establish joint attention (Tomasello et al. 2005), or use ostensive cues to mark some knowledge as generalizable (Csibra & Gergely 2009; 2011).”
A comparison of bonobo and chimpanzee tool use: evidence for a female bias in the Pan lineage (2010, positive): “However, no exchange of gaze was observed between the two individuals, suggesting that the behaviour did not serve a joint social purpose (Tomasello et al. 2005).”
Moral Foundations Theory: The Pragmatic Validity of Moral Pluralism (2012, background): “occurred when human beings developed “shared intentionality”—the ability of multiple people to hold a sharedmental representation of what they are trying to do together (Tomasello et al., 2005).”
"Autism is me": an investigation of how autistic individuals make sense of autism and stigma (2020, result): “Similarly, unfavourable comparisons to Great Apes (Tomasello et al. 2005), brain-damaged monkeys (Bainbridge 2008), and robots or chimpanzees (Pinker 2002) have been made.”
The Unconscious Mind (2008, background): “Genes primarily drive our behavior through motivations (Tomasello et al., 2005).”