Who Wants a Good Reputation

By George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson. 2001

461 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0920f88f786c7c6bad522305d380729828afeaca

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Citations in the corpus

The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Theory and Evidence from Ebay (2004, unknown): “Extension: " buying " a reputation Tadelis (1999), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and others consider the problem of buying names (and the asso ciated reputation).”
How Did Increased Competition Affect Credit Ratings (2011, unknown): “…literature that begins with Klein and Leffler (1981) argues that the formation of reputations can help support quality provision in markets where information problems would otherwise preclude it (see also Diamond 1989, Mailath and Samuelson 2001, Bar-Isaac 2005, and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008)).”
Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics (2011, background): “Therefore, i (h) = 1 for m > i : It follows from Lemma 5 that i = i +1 = = n: The argument from (21) to (22) then leads to the required contradiction.”
Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships (2012, unknown): “13 Dierent from other models such as that of Mailath and Samuelson (2001) , the Markov state is defined to be and not just p. The reason is that here, there are o-the-equilibriu m-path messages, and thus o-the-equilibriu m-path beliefs that aect strategies.”
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations (2004, unknown): “Holmström (1999), Cole, Dow, and English (1995), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and Phelan (2001) assume that the type of the longlived player is governed by a stochastic process rather than being determined once and for all at the beginning of the game.”
Efficiency in Games with Markovian Private Information (2013, methodology): “which can be interpreted as the value of a discounted zero-sum game with Markovian private information on one side (see Renault (2006) or Neyman (2008) for the undiscounted case).”
Agency Problems and Reputation in Expert Services: Evidence from Auto Repair (2012, background): “Pesendorfer and Wolinsky [2003] allow experts to choose whether to exert a costly hidden effort that is required to accurately diagnose the problem.”
Reputation for Quality (2013, background): “Value of Quality: For any admissible beliefs Ã, the value of quality is given by D(x0)= EL [∫ ∞ 0 e−(r+λ)tμ [ VH ( j(xt) ) − VH(xt)]dt ] (3.4) = EH [∫ ∞ 0 e−(r+λ)tμ [ VL ( j(xt) ) − VL(xt)]dt ] (3.5) See Appendix A.2 for the proof.”
Lemon technologies and adoption: measurement, theory and evidence from agricultural markets in Uganda (2017, background): “This suggests that farmers’ ability to infer quality may be severely limited, since we would otherwise expect prices to adjust (Shapiro 1982; Mailath and Samuelson 2001).”
Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene (2009, background): “1 See also Kreps and Wilson (1982), Mailath and Samuelson (2001) , Shapiro (1983), Tadelis (1999), and”