Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

By Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson. 2004

214 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5c4eba17afdf8f959fd28485b9d757b2ad22b110

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. E. Faingold
2. Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
3. Kay-Yut Chen
4. Ö. Özer
5. Simon Board
6. Yanchong Zheng
7. Yuliy Sannikov
8. Noah Williams

In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

1. Ö. Özer
2. Yanchong Zheng
3. E. Faingold
4. Yuliy Sannikov

Citations in the corpus

• Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games (2011, methodology): “Second, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that in a wide range of repeated games the power of reputation effects is only temporary: in any equilibrium, the large player’s type must be asymptotically revealed in the long run.2 However, apart from these two limit results (and their…”
• Reputation for Quality (2013, background): “These are instances of a more general theme: Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) show that with imperfect monitoring and fixed types, reputation is a short-run phenomenon.”
• Trust in Forecast Information Sharing (2011, background): “Researchers have shown that cooperation may not be sustained when the history of the game outcomes is not perfectly observable to the parties (e.g., Cripps et al. 2004, Radner et al. 1986).”