Long Term Incentive Plans, Executive Pay and UK Company Performance

By T. Buck, A. Bruce, Brian G. M. Main, Henry Udueni. 2003

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0808c0a4a1ac0b46842fea96d0fa86f5f05e5036

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. A. Bruce
2. Brian G. M. Main
3. T. Buck
4. Mike W. Peng

In Strategy and Management

1. A. Bruce
2. Brian G. M. Main
3. T. Buck

Citations in the corpus

• Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, unknown): “Further, Buck et al. (2003) find that the use of long-term incentive plans actually reduces the sensitivity of total reward to total shareholder return (TSR).”
• Top Executive Remuneration: A View from Europe (2005, result): “In the subsequent analysis of executive pay outturns in the UK, executive packages were found to be less responsive to share price movements when LTIPs were present ( Buck et al., 2003 ), an outcome more consistent with power theory, and the exploitation of quasi-State commissions staffed by senior ”