Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

By S. Leung, B. Horwitz. 2004

190 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0795a0bc22a364975abed4f586c86bfac64f305d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Disclosures on the Transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (2008, unknown): “level of disclosure and the proportion of independent directors on the board in a variety of contexts including interim reporting, segment disclosures and management forecasts (Leftwich et al., 1981; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; Ajinkya et al., 2005).”
The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt (2012, background): “That is, they encourage more voluntary disclosures (Adams & Hossain, 1998), speci ﬁ cally, as reported by Leung and Horwitz (2004), in relation to voluntary segment disclosure.”
Corporate social reporting and board representation: evidence from the Kenyan banking sector (2008, background): “disclosure research often excludes banking and finance institutions from their sample due to the stringent regulatory requirements associated with this sector (Hossain et al. 1994; Ismail and Chandler 2005; Khalid 2005; Leung and Horwitz 2004 ).”
Corporate Boards, Ownership Structures and Corporate Disclosures: Evidence from a Developing Country (2018, background): “Empirically, Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang and Hussainey (2013) found a negative association between director ownership and voluntary disclosure.”
Do Better-Governed Australian Firms Make More Informative Disclosures? (2006, unknown): “Leung and Horwitz (2004) examine voluntary segment data disclosures in Hong Kong and conclude non-executive directors have a positive impact on the level of voluntary disclosure, but only when there is low executive stock ownership.”
The Association of Board Independence and Ownership Concentration with Voluntary Disclosure: A Meta-analysis (2010, background): “Corporate governance attributes examined in these studies mainly include board independence and ownership concentration (e.g. Leung and Horwitz, 2004; Hannifa and Cooke, 2005; Hossain and Reaz, 2007).”
Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait (2010, background): “The ﬁ nding agrees with a study by Al-Shammari (2008) in Kuwait, as well as with those of Ho and Wong (2001) in Hong Kong, Forker (1992) in the United Kingdom, and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) in Malaysia.”
An empirical analysis of corporate governance structures and voluntary corporate disclosure in volatile capital markets: the Egyptian experience (2011, background): “Previous studies report that companies that have more outside directors on the board have more voluntary disclosures (e.g. Adams and Hossain, 1998; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Cheng and Courtenay, 2004; Leung and Horwitz, 2004; Williams, 2002).”