The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: The case of Egypt

By Khaled Samaha, Khaled Dahawy, K. Hussainey, P. Stapleton. 2012

372 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper assesses the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure and the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance (CG) attributes (board composition, board size, CEO duality, director ownership, blockholder ownership and the existence of audit committee) on the extent of corporate governance voluntary disclosure in Egypt. The measurement of disclosure is based on published data created from a checklist developed by the United Nations, which was gathered from a manual review of financial statements and websites of a sample of Egyptian companies listed on Egyptian Stock Exchange (EGX). Although the levels of CG disclosure are found to be minimal, disclosure is high for items that are mandatory under the Egyptian Accounting Standards (EASs). The failure of companies to disclose such information clearly shows some ineffectiveness and inadequacy in the regulatory framework in Egypt. Moreover, the phenomenon of non-compliance may also be attributed to socio-economic factors in Egypt. Therefore, it is expected that Egyptian firms will take a long time to appraise the payback of increased CG disclosure. The findings indicate that that—ceteris paribus—the extent of CG disclosure is (1) lower for companies with duality in position and higher ownership concentration as measured by blockholder ownership; and (2) increases with the proportion of independent directors on the board and firm size. The results of the study support theoretical arguments that companies disclose corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported accounting information. The empirical evidence from this study enhances the understanding of the corporate governance disclosure environment in Egypt as one of the emerging markets in the Middle East.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eeff6a5e9f2fe8be73f2464b1393a193a0b984fe

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Citations in the corpus

The effects of corporate governance on financial performance and financial distress: evidence from Egypt (2015, methodology): “Following Samaha et al. (2012), the reliability of our index is assessed as follows:”
The influence of board characteristics on sustainability reporting Empirical evidence from Sri Lankan firms (2014, background): “Based on the above proposition, many studies have provided empirical evidence on the effect of board composition on voluntary disclosures (Gul and Leung, 2004; Eng and Mak, 2003; Chau and Gray, 2010; Lim et al., 2007; Barako et al., 2006; Samaha et al., 2012).”
Corporate Boards, Ownership Structures and Corporate Disclosures: Evidence from a Developing Country (2018, methodology): “The multiple regression model employed is as follows:”
Corporate Boards and Ownership Structure as Antecedents of Corporate Governance Disclosure in Saudi Arabian Publicly Listed Corporations (2018, background): “…disclosure of good CG practices are generally rare (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Bozec & Bozec, 2007; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin & Ow-Yong, 2012; Salterio et al., 2013), but particularly acute in developing countries (Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Rouf, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012b; Samaha et al., 2012).”
Governance Structures, Voluntary Disclosures and Public Accountability: The Case of UK Higher Education Institutions (2017, neutral): “…et al., 2007; Chau and Gray, 2010; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013), corporate governance disclosure (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Samaha et al., 2012, 2015), SEA disclosure (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Fifka, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b) and performance (Gompers et…”
The impact of multi-layer governance on bank risk disclosure in emerging markets: the case of Middle East and North Africa (2019, background): “CG structures like CEO role dual, limited board independence, concentrated ownership structures, and poor transparency and disclosure practices (Baydoun et al., 2012; Samaha et al., 2012).”