Company Performance, Corporate Governance, and CEO Compensation in Norway and Sweden
By Trond Randøy, J. Nielsen. 2002
132 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/059dea20c51fd2979ee474d4bfb7ff1d6efebfbe
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Citations in the corpus
- Board compensation and ownership structure: empirical evidence for Italian listed companies (2011, background): “Rosen (1982) predict that larger firms require more talented and more costly management; Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988) document that larger firms, in terms of net sales, have higher paid executives, although Murphy (1999) shows that the explanatory power of firm sales has declined over time.”
- The Anglo-American financial influence on CEO compensation in non-Anglo-American firms (2005, background): “significant relationship between performance and CEO pay (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002).”
- Board members’ contribution to strategic decision-making in small firms (2007, unknown): “As a result, we carefully selected small firms with employee numbers below 30, a threshold in which the requirement is not compulsory ( Randoy and Nielsen 2002 ).”
- Toward a Behavioral Theory of Boards and Corporate Governance (2009, unknown): “…optimal incentive and monitoring structures by exploring the effects of various board structures, such as CEO duality, board composition, and board (member) independence, on firm performance (Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2001; Ellstrand, Tihyani and Johnson, 2002; Randøy and Nielsen, 2002).”
- The Adoption of IFRS 3: The Effects of Managerial Discretion and Stock Market Reactions (2011, background): “In addition, executive compensation in Sweden, and elsewhere, is influenced by norms and values in the domestic market (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002).”