Cognition and Incomplete Contracts

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The Off-Switch Game (2016, background): “e to specify a reward function that incentivizes the correct behavior in all states a priori. The is directly analogous to the assumption of incompleteness studied in theories of optimal contracting (Tirole, 2009). Kerr (1975) is a classic paper that describes a wide variety of misaligned incentives”
Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment (2018, background): “…the value of the contract [6, 49], parties may choose not to cover all contingencies because learning about them would be biased and wasteful [50], or parties may choose not to include all known and contractible contingencies in order to control strategic behavior in response to other…”
The Failure of Models that Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and Defaults (2010, background): “3Bolton and Faure-Grimaud (2009) and Tirole (2009) argue that contracts will be endogenously incomplete when there are costs involved in verifying or processing information.”