Repeated Games with Frequent Signals

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Reputation in Continuous‐Time Games (2011, background): “Finally, note that condition (24) arises naturally in the important case in which there is a continuous flow of short-lived consumers (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1992), Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004), and Faingold (2008)) instead of a cross-section population of small long-lived consumers (c”
The Economic Returns to Social Interaction: Experimental Evidence from Microfinance (2013, background): “Educated clients were more likely to give and receive tickets, while three types received more tickets: rich respondents, group leaders, and those who stated in baseline that they could make transfers 26If actions do not differentiate initial conditions, higher frequency signals may not increase the”
Building Social Capital Through Microfinance (2010, unknown): “Such a learning-based story by itself would imply that returns to mandating frequent (24)If actions do not differentiate initial conditions, higher frequency signals may not increase the reliability of information extracted from public signals (D. Abreu and Pearce, 1991; Fudenberg and Levine, 2009).”