Ron Lavi

Management Science and Operations Research · 2005–2006

A researcher in the Science corpus: 2 papers; trusts 1 researcher and is trusted by 2 researchers here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Subfields

• Management Science and Operations Research — 6 citations into it; #5,992 of 11,946 by trust here, #6,888 by citations
• Economics and Econometrics — 5 citations into it
• Marketing — 5 citations into it; #2,682 of 6,289 by trust here, #5,492 by citations

Whom Ron Lavi trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Noam Nisan
2. Daniel J. Lehmann

Who trusts Ron Lavi overall

1. Yaron Singer
2. Uriel Feige
3. Ariel D. Procaccia
4. M. Serna

Papers from Ron Lavi's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Ron Lavi trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Optimal Auction Design
2. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
3. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
4. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
5. Γ and B
6. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (Journal of Economics Theory)
7. The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities (Journal of Economics Theory)
8. Integer programming for combinatorial auction winner determination (Proceedings Fourth International Conference on MultiAgent Systems)
9. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (JACM)
10. The use of knowledge about society

Their papers

• Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming (2005) — 320 citations
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006) — 233 citations