Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement
By Han Hong. 2002
304 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fff666dce0dce14498f0aec0915a6c5c1317df89
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Patrick Bajari
- S. Houghton
- J. Marion
- T. Dunne
- Anne Yvrande-Billon
- Gregory Lewis
- Dakshina G. De Silva
- Carlos Oliveira Cruz
In Management Science and Operations Research
- S. Houghton
- S. Tadelis
- Patrick Bajari
- J. Marion
- Dakshina G. De Silva
- Georgia Kosmopoulou
- T. Dunne
- A. Kankanamge
In Strategy and Management
- Patrick Bajari
- S. Houghton
- T. Dunne
- Gregory Lewis
- Dakshina G. De Silva
- Carlos Oliveira Cruz
- Rui Cunha Marques
- S. Tadelis
Citations in the corpus
- The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions (2005, background): “D.G. De Silva et al. / European Economic Review 52 (2008) 150–181 163 This classification of projects agrees with the findings of Hong and Shum (2002).”
- Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions Under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity (2004, unknown): “Hong and Shum (2002) find some evidence of common values in the bidders' costs in the case of New Jersey highway procurement auctions.”
- Flexible contracts to cope with uncertainty in public–private partnerships (2013, background): “Furthermore, a PPP contract generally involves large sunk investments in a specific project, vulnerable to opportunistic behaviours by the concessionaires (Hong and Shum, 2002; Ubbels and Verhoed, 2008; Williamson, 1976), but also by the public sector (Engel et al., 2006; Guasch and Straub, 2009).”
- Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis (2006, methodology): “Thus, it is easy to see that our model is a simple variant of the standard models of bidding for procurement contracts (e.g., Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Pesendorfer and Jofre-Bonet (2003), Bajari and Ye (2003), Campo (2004), Krasnokutskaya (2004) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim…”
- Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions (2007, background): “Hong and Shum (2002) found that some categories of highway work exhibit characteristics suggesting they may have a common value component.”
- Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors (2011, background): “This paper is closely related to the diverse empirical literature on disclosure (recent papers include Jin and Leslie (2003) and Jin (2005)).”
- Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions (2004, unknown): “2 Hong and Shum (2002) explore this separation in a parametric model to examine the overall effect of”
- Auction Procedures and Competition in Public Services: The Case of Urban Public Transport in France and London (2009, background): “The classical hypothesis according to which increasing competition yields lower prices, which only holds true for private value auctions (Hong and Shum, 2002)11, also suggests that the degree of competitiveness of the environment affects the probability of collusion and corruption.”