Corporate Governance Externalities
By V. Acharya, Paolo F. Volpin. 2010
161 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fdce975764e1a649d382c2d0f19a839bf10385dd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Alex Edmans
- Xavier Gabaix
- George Serafeim
- Caroline Flammer
- Hao Liang
- Suleyman Basak
- Anna Pavlova
- Philipp Krueger
In Finance
- Xavier Gabaix
- Alex Edmans
- George Serafeim
- Caroline Flammer
- Hao Liang
- Markus Pelger
- Darrell Duffie
- Anna Pavlova
Citations in the corpus
- Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Similarly, Acharya and Volpin (2010) and Dicks (2012) show that if one rm overpays its executives (e.g., due to poor governance), other rms must do so also to remain competitive, even if they are well-governed. Bereskin and Cicero (2013) nd evidence of such contagion. Changes in Delaware case law”
- Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation (2012, unknown): “Acharya and Volpin(2010) also derive a corporate governance externality operating through executive compensation.”
- Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “20 See, for example, Acharya and Volpin (2010), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Weisbach (1988), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Fich and Shivdasani (2005, 2006), and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008a,b).”
- Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent (2016, unknown): “The fact that competition for scarce talent in our model introduces an externality in wage setting is reminiscent of the corporate governance externalities formalized by Acharya and Volpin (2009) and Dicks (2012).”
- The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance (2016, unknown): “uSH ( i; i1; :::; iK) = vSH ( i) + gSH i ; (2)”
- The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, background): “Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), Acharya and Volpin (2010), Axelson and Bond (2010), Dicks (2010), Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2010) add moral hazard but assume risk-neutrality and thus cannot investigate the e¤ect of risk, risk aversion or risk-taking.3 Adding risk aversion is typically a…”