Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation
By N. Rose, Catherine D. Wolfram. Journal of Labor Economics, 2002
118 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fca502cb25337deebf3f8e7535ea331ecbb8075d
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In Accounting
- B. Gerhart
- I. Fulmer
- Daniel Bergstresser
- Thomas Philippon
- S. Rynes
- F. Yu
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Liandong Zhang
Citations in the corpus
- Shareholder Primacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools (2014, unknown): “The purpose was to limit executive compensation perceived as being ‘‘excessive,’’ although research suggests that the law has had little effect on executive compensation in practice (Rose and Wolfram 2002).”
- 6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “Results are mixed on whether this policy has had the effect of increasing the sensitivity of pay to performance for affected firms (Perry & Zenner, 2001 ; Rose & Wolfram, 2002 ) but it has had virtually no effect on overall pay levels, as the level of all pay components has increased since 1993 (C”
- CEO Incentives and Earnings Management (2006, background): “See Rose and Wolfram (2002) for a discussion of the relationship between these tax code changes and executive compensation.”