Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns
By David Yermack. 2006
491 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fb83823cf963241ad389fd1d592d2823155a706a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Alex Edmans
- Ronald W. Masulis
- S. W. Reza
- Mariassunta Giannetti
- Yrjö Koskinen
- Jillian Grennan
- Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk
- Hayong Yun
In Finance
- Ronald W. Masulis
- Alex Edmans
- Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk
- Yrjö Koskinen
- S. W. Reza
- Mariassunta Giannetti
- Gilles Hilary
- Rencheng Wang
In Strategy and Management
- Alex Edmans
- Jillian Grennan
- Ronald W. Masulis
- S. W. Reza
- Mariassunta Giannetti
- Aleksandra J. Kacperczyk
- Hayong Yun
- Yrjö Koskinen
Citations in the corpus
- Executive Compensation: A New View from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936-2005 (2010, background): “By contrast, Sundaram and Yermack (2006) find increases in the actuarial value of pensions to be about 10 percent of total CEO pay from 1996 to 2002, and Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) report a ratio of executives’ retirement benefits to total pay received during their entire service as CEO of about 34…”
- The impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of bank loans (2011, background): “unnecessary corporate jets (Yermack (2006)) or other excessive perquisite consumption.”
- Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment (2008, background): “Hidden compensation takes many forms, including managerial perks (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Yermack (2006a), Rajan and Wulf (2006)), lavish pension plans (Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Bebchuk and Jackson (2005)) and generous severance agreements (Yermack (2006b)).”
- Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives (2011, background): “These control variables include an indicator that equals one for 33 firms that nominate new independent directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and an additional indicator for four firms that disclose nominations of new grey directors who have conflicts of interest (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999); an ”
- Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization (2009, background): “Our model offers an explanation for a growing body of empirical evidence showing that weak investor protection is negatively related to stock returns (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), Cremers and Nair (2005), and Yermack (2006)).”
- Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity Prices (2011, methodology): “The number of rms is comparable to similar abnormal return studies, e.g. 237 in Yermack (2006) and 193 in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009).”
- The Bright Side of Managerial Over-Optimism (2016, background): “Finally, we define , our fourth measure of effort, as the total length of trips (in hours) to suspected vacation destinations over a quarter (multiplied by minus one), which proxies for CEO’s sacrifice of their leisure time (Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Yermack, 2006; 2014).”
- With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders (2009, background): “For example, Yermack (2006) finds that personal use of a company's aircraft by the CEO affects adversely its stock value.”
- Corporate Jets and Private Meetings with Investors (2018, unknown): “Yermack (2006) finds sustained underperformance by firms that allow the”
- Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China (2011, background): “2 See, for example, Dale-Olsen (2007) and Yermack (2006). samples in Table 4 suggest that perks may also be paid to motivate managers in China.”
- CEO Greed, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Organizational Resilience to Systemic Shocks (2020, background): “This variable captures the use of perks and various personal benefits, which tend to reflect agency costs and rent extraction, because shareholders do not consider such forms of compensation to reflect pay for managerial ability (Yermack, 2006).”
- Environmental regulation and the cost of bank loans: International evidence (2020, background): “They view these costs as a manifestation of the agency conflict similar to the self-dealing problem, as in Yermack (2006).”