Variants of uncertainty.

By Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky. 1982

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Citations in the corpus

Conceptions of sample and their relationship to statistical inference (2002, background): “On the basis of empirical evidence Kahneman and Tversky (1972) hypothesized that people often base judgments of the probability that a sample will occur on the degree to which they think the sample “(i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient f”
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment (1983, unknown): “Elsewhere (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a), we distinguished between positive and negative accounts of judgments and preferences that violate normative rules.”
The cognitive structure of surprise: looking for basic principles (2007, background): “4Notice that “to feel surprised” should not be confused with “having awareness of our own surprise” (for a distinction betweenphenomenal consciousnessandaccess consciousnessee Bloch, 1995; Chalmers, 1995).”
Learning to Understand the Forms of Causality Implicit in Scientifically Accepted Explanations (2003, background): “As support, she draws upon the extensive literature documenting the difficulties that adults have in reasoning about random phenomena and evidence that adults, too, often use simplified strategies (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Konold, 1991).”
Cultural Differences in Travel Risk Perception (2006, background): “Thus, individuals may perceive the same risk in different ways (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).”
Heuristics and Biases: Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate? (2002, unknown): “Kahneman and Tversky (1982) themselves (pp. 132–35) were among the first to discuss the issue of conversational implicatures in the tasks employed in the heuristics and biases research program.”
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment. (2002, background): “We assume that most participants in judgment studies know, at least vaguely, that the baserate is relevant and that the conjunction rule is valid (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).”
Heuristics and Biases: Introduction – Heuristics and Biases: Then and Now (2002, background): “(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982b, also offered positive and negative approaches to judgment errors, a perspective that is taken up by Kahneman & Frederick, Chapter 2.)”
Uncertainty, Knowledge Problems, and Entrepreneurial Action (2018, background): “…in the field of entrepreneurship has been led for decades by a cadre of scholars who have explored the role of complexity and systems dynamics in shaping organizational emergence (Gartneret al., 1992;Katz&Gartner, 1988;Lichtenstein, Carter, Dooley, &Gartner, 2007; Tornikoski &Newbert, 2007).”