Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment
By Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman. 1983
How researchers see this paper
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- Jonathan Evans
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- Josh Tenenbaum
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- Ralph Hertwig
- S. van der Linden
- Yoshua Bengio
Citations in the corpus
- Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciences (2017, methodology): “In particular, Kahneman and Tversky note that people did not simply undo the event with the lowest prior probability in the scenario.”
- The Ethical Dangers of Deliberative Decision Making (2011, background): “…research in the decision-making literature, for instance, has primarily focused on how correlates of the intuitive process (e.g., emotions) can Deliberative Decision Making 7/ASQ, March 2011 flood the consciousness and take control of behaviors (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; LeDoux, 1996).”
- Rational choice and the framing of decisions (1990, background): “In particular, elementary blunders of probabilistic reasoning (Grether 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1983), major inconsistencies of choice (Grether and Plott 1979; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983), and violations of stochastic dominance in nontransparent problems (see problem 2 above) are hardly reduced ”
- The ‘heuristics and biases’ bias in expert elicitation (2007, background): “Despite this Tversky and Kahneman (1983) give many more examples in different contexts (such as with medical students) to support the view that probabilistic coherency is not a natural ability for many people.”
- Deciding Analytically or Trusting your Intuition? The Advantages and Disadvantages of Analytic and Intuitive Thought (2002, background): “(See also the description of the famous “Linda” in the feminist bank-clerk scenario, Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).”
- The Evolution of Cognitive Bias (2015, methodology): “We do not seek to make commitments about these definitions here; rather, we use bias throughout this chapter in the relatively noncommittal sense defined above.”
- Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy (2014, methodology): “These figures have generally been borne out by subsequent research using a wide variety of conjunction scenarios (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Fiedler, 1988; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996, 1997, 1998; Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 2009; Rogers, Fisk, & Wiltshire, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wolford et al., 1990).”
- Can behavioral decision theory explain risk-averse fire management decisions? (2005, background): “The mental shortcuts that have been identified by behavioral psychology are fascinating in part because they are so compelling; even experts well trained in probabilistic forecasting fall prey to these mental shortcuts (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983).”
- Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Cognitive Styles and Historical Reasoning (2001, background): “The textbook illustration is the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and Kahneman 1983).”