Children's counterfactual inferences about long and short causal chains
By Tim P. German, Shaun Nichols. 2003
105 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences, Statistics and Probability
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fae8e8ec1501c46a585be752586831b846bf228f
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In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Michael Tomasello
- Felix Warneken
- Hannes Rakoczy
- S. Klein
- Sarah R. Beck
- S. Gorniak
- Shaun Nichols
- Tim P. German
In General Decision Sciences
In Statistics and Probability
Citations in the corpus
- A THEORY OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY: NECESSARY COMPONENTS AND DISORDERS RESULTING FROM THEIR LOSS (2004, background): “Leslie and colleagues (German & Leslie, 2000; German & Nichols, 2003; Leslie, 1994b, 2000b; Leslie, German & Pollizi, in press; Leslie & Pollizi, 1998; see also Bloom & German, 2000) propose that inhibitory control must be present, alongside M-representations, for children to calculate correctly…”
- “This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires (2007, background): “…tasks in Study 2 had a more complex inferential structure than the tasks in Study 1: in Study 2 one additional inferential step was required, as noted above (and we know that inferential complexity affects children's performance in similar tasks, see Cassidy et al., 2005; German & Nichols, 2003).”
- Relating developments in children's counterfactual thinking and executive functions (2009, background): “In Riggs et al.’s (1998) location change task, and German and Nichols’ (2003) causal chains task, children hear a narrative describing a specific event.”
- The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking (2008, background): “…early in life (typically by age 2) and seems to be evident as soon as children have mastered the lexical skills to express subjunctive ideas of “if only” (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006; Dias & Harris, 1990; German & Nichols, 2003; Harris, 1991; Perner, Sprung, & Steinkogler, 2004).”
- The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts (2004, background): “Another, much more ambitious compatibilist proposal is that when people claim that an agent could have done otherwise, what they really mean is a tacitly conditionalized ‘would’ statement: the agent would have done otherwise if the conditions had been”