Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter

By Kenneth M. Kletzer, Brian D. Wright. 2000

356 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa24d29594d7892d6f1868b0fd25fc488fb3d71c

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Citations in the corpus

Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies (2002, background): “Renegotiation proofness (including stronger concepts) for models very close to that of Thomas and Worrall (1988) has been established in Asheim and Strand (1991) and in Kletzer and Wright (1996) , and a similar argument is applicable here.”
A Political Economy Model of Sovereign Debt Repayment (2002, background): “rJ + J 0 ((r + )W + D) + J (Y D) J + h J 0 + (2)W (2)J 00 = 0 (21)”
Sovereign default and debt renegotiation (2010, background): “Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000) , Wright (2002), and Amador (2003) analyze various ways to reduce the range of a defaulting country’s saving mechanism, so that a reputation model can generate positive international lending.”
Politicians, Taxes, and Debt (2010, unknown): “See also Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000), Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kletzer and Wright (2000) and Thomas and Worrall (1988).”
Economic Growth with Constraints on Tax Revenues and Public Debt: Implications for Fiscal Policy and Cross-Country Differences * (2007, unknown): “If the Kletzer and Wright (2000) model of credible sanctions were adopted, borrowing to finance either recurrent public expenditures or investment in public sector infrastructure would be limited by the ongoing gains from smoothing against stochastic productivity shocks.”
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default (2009, background): “…Bulow-Rogoff result applies, i.e., no borrowing can be sustained if the lending relationship is sufficiently long 11 Perhaps because authors such as Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002), and Amador (2003) argue that the Bulow–Rogoff critique could in principle be overcome, an even more recent…”
Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts (2011, background): “Like in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) we use the collected restructuring details to 1 See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) or, more recently, Kletzer and Wright (2000), Amador (2003), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Kovrijnykh and Szentes…”
Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt (2006, background): “Two papers which, instead, assume multilateral lack of commitment are Kletzer and Wright (2000) and Kehoe and Perri (2002).”
Credit Frictions and 'Sudden Stops' in Small Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging Markets Crises (2002, unknown): “More recently, Kletzer and Wright (2000) proposed an environment in which both lenders and borrowers lack capacity of commitment.”
Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account (2004, unknown): “The economy will not default as long as V G ≥ V B, or rB Y ≤ 1−exp(−(12)γσ(2)z).”
Reputations and Sovereign Debt (2001, background): “Wright [20] (although they refer to it as strong perfection) and M.”
Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment (2000, background): “Informal insurance in this context has been studied by Thomas and Worrall (1988), Kletzer and Wright (1996), Kocherlakota (1996), Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (1997), and Gauthier, Poitevin, and González (1997) amongst others.”