A Political Economy Model of Sovereign Debt Repayment

By Manuel Amador. 2002

122 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default (2009, background): “9 Manuel Amador (2003) presents a model in which governments undersave because they know that they may lose power, but at the same time wish to retain access to capital markets since they count on returning to power eventually (this fits a situation in which several established parties alternate in ”
Heterogeneous Borrowers in Quantitative Models of Sovereign Default (2009, unknown): “This is not the case in the environments studied by Amador (2003) and Cuadra and Sapriza (2008).”
Long-Duration Bonds and Sovereign Defaults (Revised July 2009) (2009, background): “In order to shed light on the government’s optimal choices, we next discuss the Euler equation that determines these choices.”
The costs and benefits of balanced budget rules: Lessons from a political economy model of fiscal policy (2016, unknown): “The political economy of government debt defaults has been analyzed by Aghion and Bolton (1990), Amador (2003), Cole, Dow and English (1995), and Tabellini (1991) among others.”
Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium (2022, unknown): “This subsection shows that assuming shortsighted governments increases the gains to be had by introducing fiscal rules.”
Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk (2011, unknown): “We study the effects of debt dilution in the presence of the first two features mentioned above (the lack of commitment to future repayment policies and (4)Bi (2006) presents a quantitative analysis of a model with one and two-quarter bonds.”
Government Reputation and Debt Repayment in Emerging Economies (2008, background): “75); (iii) economic fundamentals (like debt levels and output) are correlated with default and repayment (on average, default happens in bad times and repayment when the economy recovers) but political factors are also crucial in determining government’s default and renegotiation decisions.(3) This ”
Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties (2009, unknown): “Agents are ordered according to their period-0 income endowment, wi, with the index i ∈ [0, 1] running across the entire population.”
Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (2007, unknown): “This force for government impatience is prominent in several other political economy models, for example Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) and Amador (2004).”
What is a Sustainable Public Debt (2015, unknown): “31 This relates to the literature on political economy and sovereign default, which largely focuses on external default (e.g. Amador (2003), Dixit and Londregan (2000), D’Erasmo (2011), Guembel and Sussman (2009), Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sapriza (2009) and Tabellini (1991)), but includes studies…”
Sovereign default and debt renegotiation (2010, background): “Cole and Kehoe (1998), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Wright (2002), and Amador (2003) analyze various ways to reduce the range of a defaulting country’s saving mechanism, so that a reputation model can generate positive international lending.”
A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles (2011, unknown): “The model is broadly consistent with three key stylized facts of sovereign debt: (1) the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates around default events, (2) the negative correlation between interest rates on sovereign debt and output, and (3) high debt-output ratios on average and when defaults take pla”