Mutual Insurance, Individual Savings and Limited Commitment

By Ethan Ligon, Jonathan P. Thomas, T. Worrall. 2000

226 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c4e3747ecd585b04db6bbe1dc79e94fccea5951a

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Citations in the corpus

Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies (2002, unknown): “…Õ á å²ØtÝ õ ã"ÚLØ ã Û´á Ø+á§ÞTÝPß î Ý Þ î Ú¯Ù ÚIá å=×²ÕLØtÚLßªábÕLâ ã # õ Ý ß ß Ýlé épÖLã Õ Ùª×²î%ã Ø-á ßtã õIá Û ábÕLÛùß ã ïIáHÜ'épÖLã ÕùÙª×¸î ã Ø+á ßtã"æPÝ°ÝYÛ Ê è ÖLã ß ã ×¸Ø á î%ïLå²ã"ã ä°×²ÛLã ÕLâ ã ÙªÖLábÙ3å²Ý á Õ¯ØNá ß ã ÚLØtã Û ÞTÝPßNî Ú¯ÙªÚLá åf×²Õ¯Ø ÚLß á ÕLâ ã ïLÚ¯ß ï7ÝPØ ã Ø êTØ ã…”
Consumption smoothing in island economies : can public insurance reduce welfare? (2000, methodology): “Ligon et al. (1998) estimate the model by simulating numerically the solution of the enforceable contract.”
Formal and informal risk sharing in LDCs : theory and empirical evidence (2008, background): “When savings are publicly monitored but privately owned, it would a¤ect the outside options of a deviant agent and would also raise convexity issues (see Ligon et al., 2000).”
Contract Structure, Risk Sharing and Investment Choice (2011, background): “Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) consider a simple storage technology and find that the ability to self-insure can crowd out informal transfers, with ambiguous welfare implications.”
Why Don’t the Poor Save More? Evidence from Health Savings Experiments. (2013, unknown): “For example, Shipton (1990) describes how people in the Gambia make their own wooden lockboxes, which they smash open once they have reached their savings goal.”
Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philippines (2003, unknown): “With imperfect commitment but no assets, informal risk-sharing arrangements are more easily satisfied if straight gifts are combined with contingent credit (e.g., Kocherlakota, 1996; Ligon et al., 2000).”
International Monetary Policy Coordination and Financial Market Integration (2002, unknown): “The portfolio payoffs for home and foreign agents are given by the following R (h) = ζH (h) (y − qH) + ζF (h) (y∗ − qF ) (17) R∗ (f) = ζH (f) (y − qH) + ζF (f) (y∗ − qF ) (18) where ζH (h) and ζF (h) are holdings of home agent h of the home and foreign assets, ζ ∗ H (f) and ζF (f) are the holdings o”
GENDER A ND SAY: A MODEL O F H OUSEHOLD BEHAVIOUR W ITH ENDOGENOUSLY D ETERMINED BALANCE OF POWER* (2006, unknown): “…and Brown (1980); McElroy and Horney (1981); Folbre (1986); Mencher (1988); Sen (1983, 1990); Thomas (1990); Bourguignon and Chiappori (1994); Browning et al. (1994); Moehling (1995); Udry (1996); Agarwal (1997); Riley (1997); Haddad et al. (1997); Basu (1999); Ligon et al. (2000); Haller (2000).”
Why is Mobility in India so Low? Social Insurance, Inequality, and Growth (2009, background): “Although Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) consider the welfare effects of introducing alternative risk-sharing arrangements, a welfare analysis of this sort is beyond the scope of the paper.”