Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies

By Ethan Ligon, Jonathan P. Thomas, Tim Worrall. 2002

738 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Soil Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/391360cefc98cbe503070f551b08f1cb7a256d16

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Marcel Fafchamps
2. Esther Duflo
3. Christopher R. Udry
4. Mark R. Rosenzweig
5. Erwin H. Bulte
6. Kaivan Munshi
7. J. Weerdt
8. A. Barr

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Marcel Fafchamps
2. Stefan Dercon
3. Esther Duflo
4. A. M. Mobarak
5. Kaivan Munshi
6. Christopher R. Udry
7. Melanie Morten
8. Mark R. Rosenzweig

In Soil Science

1. Marcel Fafchamps
2. Esther Duflo
3. Stefan Dercon
4. Salvatore Di Falco
5. Mark R. Rosenzweig
6. A. M. Mobarak
7. Melanie Morten
8. Kaivan Munshi

Citations in the corpus

• Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements (2003, background): “A recent strand of literature investigates efficient dynamic contracts in the absence of commitment (Kocherlakota (1996), Kletzer and Wright (2000), Ligon et al. (2002)).”
• THE TIME STRUCTURE OF SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS (2002, neutral): “, Townsend (1993) and Udry (1994)), both development economists and theorists have made recent efforts to model this phenomenon (see, e.”
• Rural Financial Markets in Developing Countries (2005, neutral): “Ligon et al. (2002) provide an explicit characterization of such reciprocal transfer arrangements in an economy that allowed for both idiosyncratic shocks and common 46 shocks that could be correlated over time.”
• Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Cote D'Ivoire: Social Norms, Separate Accounts and Consumption Choices (2004, methodology): “In this model (Coate and Ravallion (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and Ligon et al. (2002)), individuals cannot commit to remain part of the informal insurance arrangement.”
• Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness (2006, background): “due to enforcement or information constraints): they would imply partial and not complete smoothing (Ligon, 1998; Ligon et al., 2002 ).”
• RISK SHARING, COMMITMENT, AND INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (2008, background): “Moreover, following Platteau (1994a, 1994b), Fafchamps (1992, 1996), Posner and Rasmusen (1999), Kreps (1997) and others, it is important to acknowledge that both extrinsic incentives, especially sanctions that can credibly be threatened, and intrinsic motivations, such as altruism, inequality avers”