Reputations and Sovereign Debt

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Credit Frictions and 'Sudden Stops' in Small Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging Markets Crises (2002, unknown): “This brings the model closer to the analysis of participation constraints under incomplete markets by Zhang (1997) than to the models in the Kehoe-Levine-Kocherlakota line.”
Sovereign default and debt renegotiation (2010, background): “Direct sanctions, λsy, can be avoided if the creditors can be persuaded to waive sanctions in debt renegotiations.”
Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts (2011, background): “10 Finger and Mecagni (2007) Moody’s/ Bedford et al.”
Heterogeneous Borrowers in Quantitative Models of Sovereign Default (2009, unknown): “…become more competitive and explains how an increase in competition (number of creditors) may diminish the creditors’ ability to coordinate; see also Wright (2002).9 Second, empirical studies suggest that once variables such as the quality of policies and institutions are used as controls, market…”
Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment (2012, unknown): “Finally, note that from the proof of lemma 8 above, the density for the minimum settlement time out of i random variables is given by equation (52) and (51).”