One-year-old infants use teleological representations of actions productively

By Gergely Csibra, Szilvia Bíró, Orsolya Koós, György Gergely. 2003

355 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology, Cognitive Science & Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Unmasking Clever Hans predictors and assessing what machines really learn (2019, background): “A major difference between machine and human learning is that humans (even infants) are equipped with a “start-up” software [62, 63] consisting of a priori representation about objects and physics [64,65] and about other agents [66,67].”
Social learning and social cognition: The case for pedagogy (2006, background): “Such inferences are guided by the assumption that the teacher's acts convey novel and relevant knowledge, but, just like the inferential interpretation of goal-directed acts ( Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003 ), they must rely on the learner's already accumulated background knowledge.”
Goal attribution to inanimate agents by 6.5-month-old infants. (2008, background): “1A and B), and nor did Gergely and Csibra find such a result in any of their studies (Csibra et al., 1999; Csibra et al., 2003; Gergely et al., 1995).”
Investigating action understanding: inferential processes versus action simulation. (2007, background): “Contextual effects on inferential processes involved in action understanding have been successfully demonstrated already in preverbal infants [5] by violation-ofexpectation paradigms [15]$ Recently, Gergely, Bekkering, and Király [24] developed an experimental paradigm to isolate the relevant compon”
The posterior superior temporal sulcus is sensitive to the outcome of human and non-human goal-directed actions. (2011, methodology): “None declared.”
Goal Inference as Inverse Planning (2007, background): “How is this feat of induction possible? A possible solution, proposed by several philosophers and psychologists, is that these inferences are enabled by an intuitive theory of agency that embodies the principle of rationality: the assumption that rational agents tend to achieve their desires as opti”
Infants' Understanding of Looking, Pointing, and Reaching as Cues to Goal-Directed Action (2004, background): “2000) and draw inferences, consistent with the rational action principle, about unseen events in teleological action sequences ( Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003 ).”
Accurate judgments of intention from motion cues alone: A cross-cultural study (2005, background): “…that the improved accuracy in children aged 4 and 5 reflects an improved ability to understand artificial visual displays or to understand our verbal labels for intentional actions, given that nonverbal techniques have shown that infants can attribute goals to moving objects (Csibra et al., 2003).”
Action experience alters 3-month-old infants' perception of others' actions. (2005, background): “During the first year of life infants encode certain events as goal-directed, that is, they represent human actions (14, 15, 16, 17, 18) and certain object motions (19, 20, 21) with respect tothe objects and outcomes to which they are directed, rather than in terms of their superficial perceptual pr”
Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, methodology): “…claw; that Csibra et al. (1999) found that 9- but not 6-month-olds succeeded at a detour task in which a small circle approached a large circle; that Csibra et al. (2003) found that 12- but not 9-month-olds succeeded at a detour task in which a large circle chased a small circle; and that Kamewari…”
Exploring the neural correlates of goal-directed action and intention understanding (2011, neutral): “A principle of rational action assesses the efficiency of behaviors in context so that one could use action information to determine what end state could be efficiently achieved through such means or predict selection of an efficient course of action to achieve a known goal (Csibra and Gergely, 1998”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “For example, when familiarized with a geometrical ‘agent’ who jumps over a barrier to reach another such agent, infants are surprised if the agent doesn’t take a direct route to the target once the barrier is removed, but instead jumps in the same trajectory as before (Csibra et al., 2003).”
Temporo-parietal Junction Activity in Theory-of-Mind Tasks: Falseness, Beliefs, or Attention (2009, background): “Behavior that suits this purpose (without unnecessary deviations) is also called a rational action (Csibra, Biro, Koos, & Gergely, 2003 ; Blackburn, 1994 ; Cherniak, 1994 ).”
Sylvia's Recipe: The Role of Imitation and Pedagogy in the Transmission of Cultural Knowledge (2006, background): “In terms of the abstract representational and interpretive system of the one-year-old’s ‘teleological stance’ (Csibra et al. 2003; Gergely and Csibra 2003), goals are identified and attributed to actions whenever efficiency considerations justify the actions as optimal means to achieve the goal in…”
'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans. (2007, background): “, 2005), geometric shapes (Gergely et al., 1995; Csibra et al., 2003; Wagner & Carey, 2005), even when these actors do not exhibit unambiguous agency or animacy cues (Csibra et al.”