How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection ☆

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Mutual Fund Performance and the Incentive to Generate Alpha (2012, background): “…(2012), Chalmers and Reuter (2012), Mullainathan, Nöth, and Schoar (2012), and Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2012) for empirical evidence, and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) for theoretical models of the impact of brokers and bundled advice on investor welfare.”
Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies (2015, background): “See, e.g., Malkiel (2013) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012).”
Behavioral Contract Theory (2014, background): “Similarly, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) and Murooka (2013) show that because the distorted advice financial advisors provide is driven by the large commissions firms pay, capping or banning commissions, or requiring commissions to be uniform across products, can raise consumer welfare.30 30…”