The distribution of earnings in an equilibrium search model with state-dependent offers and counteroffers

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To Match or Not To Match? Optimal Wage Policy with Endogenous Worker Search Intensity ∗ (2004, methodology): “As was shown by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b), if employers are perfectly aware of all workers characteristics and job opportunities, then it is optimal for them to offer their reservation wage to any worker the Þrm comes in contact with.”
Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity (2002, unknown): “(24) 2 (1 ¡ 3⁄4) Z 0 (y) Z (y) [U (p (y)) ¡ y] + £ U 0 (p (y)) p0 (y) ¡ 1 ¤ = ¡ 1 + ·1 ·1Z (y) 1 ¡ 3⁄4 ·1 1+·1Z (y) 1 ¡ 3⁄4 :”
An on-the-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment (2004, unknown): “In particular, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) report 0 = :077, 1 = :012 and = :005, and say that these estimates are roughly consistent with previous results.”
Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: Theory and evidence (2006, unknown): “The model builds on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), which is a competitive model with search frictions.”
Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2003, background): “Using equation (13) to eliminate R from equation (12) gives the equation that determines the steady-state equilibrium value of θ, namely,”