To Match or Not To Match? Optimal Wage Policy with Endogenous Worker Search Intensity ∗

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Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity (2002, methodology): “Note that the di¤erential equation providing expression (25) can be solved even if function y(p) = E [U(w)jp] is not everywhere increasing.”
Learning Your Comparative Advantages (2014, background): “Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) and Moscarini (2008) argue that it may be profitable for firms to commit ex ante not to match outside offers.”
Estimation of a Roy/Search/Compensating Differential Model of the Labor Market (2020, unknown): “As in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), one of three things can happen.”
The Empirical Content of the Job Search Model: Labor Mobility and Wage Distributions in Europe and the US (2006, background): “Yet offering a flat wage profile is not generally optimal for the employer (see Stevens, 2004; Burdett and Coles, 2003; Postel-Vinay and Robin 2002a–c for explorations of the consequences of allowing more sophisticated wage contracts).”