All-Pay Auctions - An Experimental Study
By Uri Gneezy, Rann Smorodinsky. 2006
161 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f26d94b46299d1af8d07957066dcbcc3c1c6fa2d
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
In Safety Research
Citations in the corpus
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests (2009, unknown): “Smorodinsky (2006).”
- Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, unknown): “Nevertheless, Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006) found that the over-dissipation in the all-pay auction is independent of the group size in later periods.”
- Endowment Effects in Contests (2009, unknown): “The E protocol has been used by Davis and Reilly (1998), Barut et al. (2002), Gneezy and Smorodinsky (2006), and Noussair and Jonathon (2006).”
- Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Finally, all-pay auctions have been used in the auction literature and in lobbying and military applications (Barut et al., 2002; Noussair and Silver, 2006; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Kovenock et al., 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; and Chowdhury et al., 2013).”
- An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games (2011, unknown): “6 This result is striking because the vast majority of experimental studies on contests document that payoffs do not conform to theoretical predictions (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2008, 2009).”
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “…et al. (1998), the majority of studies using symmetric all-pay auctions with complete information also find that session averages reflect overbidding (Gneezy and Smorodinsky 2006; Lugovskyy et al. 2010; Fehr and Schmidt 2011; Klose and Sheremeta 2012; Ernst and Thöni 2013; Ong and Chen 2013).”
- Fight or Flight? (2012, unknown): “Such significant over-expenditure is not uncommon in experimental literature on contests and all-pay auctions (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy, et al., 2010; Sheremeta, 2010a, 2010b).”