An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
By Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta. Economic Theory, 2011
162 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1a7b5303341d3bb5da336691379cb562b9740402
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Citations in the corpus
- From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games (2016, background): “Although the Colonel Blotto game was initially proposed to study a war situation, it has found applications in the analysis of many different forms of competition: from sports, to advertisement, to politics [37, 33, 36, 13, 30, 31], and has thus become one of the most well-known games in classic gam”
- Fight or Flight? (2012, unknown): “Chowdhury et al. (2011) report similar behavior in constantsum Colonel Blotto games between asymmetric players.”
- Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Finally, all-pay auctions have been used in the auction literature and in lobbying and military applications (Barut et al., 2002; Noussair and Silver, 2006; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Lugovskyy et al., 2010; Kovenock et al., 2010; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012; and Chowdhury et al., 2013).”
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “Chowdhury et al. (2014) find that overbidding in lottery contests significantly decreases when the cost of effort is convex instead of linear. Similarly, Müller and Schotter (2010) find that overbidding in all-pay auctions vanishes when the cost function is strictly convex instead of linear.”