Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
By Roman M. Sheremeta. Games Econ. Behav., 2009
362 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/842e44f04dfceec969fe0a53ec89b43534ac3e9b
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Citations in the corpus
- A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, methodology): “Interestingly, in a two-stage elimination contest and a related design, Sheremeta (2010a) also finds that the effect of carryover is to increase first-stage effort levels and decrease second-stage effort.”
- Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, positive): “One way to incorporate the utility of winning into a contest model described in Section 3, is to assume that in addition to the prize value , individuals also have an additive utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010).”
- Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two-Stage Political Contests (2010, methodology): “This finding is consistent with previous experimental studies of Davis and Reilly (1998), Sheremeta (2010), and Sheremeta and Zhang (forthcoming).”
- Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, neutral): “11 This over-expenditure of effort in contests between individuals can be explained by a nonmonetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2015; Cason et al., 2013), bounded rationality (Fallucchi et al.”
- Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, neutral): “Finally, recent experiments have found evidence that subjects have a non-monetary utility of winning a Tullock contest, and this can partially explain overdissipation of effort (Parco et al., 2005; Sheremeta, 2010b).”
- SIMULTANEOUS DECISION‐MAKING IN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTS (2013, neutral): “The high variance in individual bids is consistent with 10 Sheremeta (2010a; 2010b; 2011) and Sheremeta and Zheng (2010) cite noise and errors, probability judgment biases, and a non-monetary utility of winning as explanations for overbidding. previous experimental findings on contests (e.g., Davis…”
- A generalized Tullock contest (2011, methodology): “To test these predictions, one could design an experiment similar to Sheremeta (2010a, 2010b).”
- Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation (2009, neutral): “13 It is also consistent with Sheremeta (2008), who conducted one treatment equivalent to the GC treatment.”
- Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence (2013, neutral): “14 Some studies that document significant overbidding in contests are done by Davis and Reilly (1998), Potters et al. (1998), Sheremeta (2010, 2011), Sheremeta and Zhang (2010), Price and Sheremeta (2011, 2013), Cason et al. (2012), Chowdhury et al. (2012), Lim et al. (2012), Mago et al. (2012,…”
- Facing Your Opponents (2014, positive): “Nonmonetary utility of winning w is not directly observable, but following Sheremeta (2010b) we elicited it as follows: in a ‘‘surprise’’ additional period at the end of the experiment, all subjects were given an endowment of eighty francs and participated in a lottery contest for a prize valued at…”
- Endowment Effects in Contests (2009, neutral): “suggests that winning may be a component in a subject’s utility (Sheremeta, 2010).”
- Fight or Flight? (2012, neutral): “…(Friedman et al. 2007).17 Several other possible explanations, proposed in the literature, include subjects having a nonmonetary value of winning (Sheremeta 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta 2011), having spiteful preferences (Herrmann and Orzen 2008) or making mistakes (Potters et al. 1998;…”