Endowment Effects in Contests

By Roman M. Sheremeta, Curtis R. Price. 2009

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b12d43c1337cfa296a25f78db81cef2d4fefa611

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In General Decision Sciences

1. Dan Kovenock
2. Emmanuel Dechenaux
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury

In Safety Research

1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
2. Dan Kovenock
3. Roman M. Sheremeta
4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury
5. Shakun D. Mago
6. Anya Samak

Citations in the corpus

• Facing Your Opponents (2014, unknown): “Replicating other studies (e.g., Sheremeta 2010a, 2010b; Price and Sheremeta 2011, 2015), we find that nonmonetary utility of winning can explain the significant overexpenditure of effort (result 1).”
• A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments (2014, background): “The first is that, in addition to monetary incentives, subjects derive a non-monetary utility from winning (Schmitt et al. 2004; Parco et al. 2005; Sheremeta 2010a, b; Price and Sheremeta 2011, 2014; Brookins and Ryvkin 2014; Mago et al. 2014).”
• Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence (2013, unknown): “…been subject to extensive experimental scrutiny (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Tong and Leung, 2002; Anderson and Stafford, 2003; Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; Nieken and Sliwka, 2010; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010, Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2013; Lim et al., 2012; Morgan et al., 2012).”
• Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum (2012, unknown): “Sheremeta (2011) shows how quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995), which accounts for individual errors, can explain some of the over-dissipation observed in lottery contests.”
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (2013, unknown): “Contests have been commonly used in the study of R&D races and political or rent-seeking competitions (Millner and Pratt, 1989; Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2010, 2011; Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Price and Sheremeta, 2011, 2012; Morgan et al., 2012).”
• Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (2015, unknown): “Also, similar to the findings of Sheremeta (2011), stronger players expend more effort (and sometimes earn lower payoff) than weaker players.”