Auctions: Theory and Practice

By Paul Klemperer. 2004

375 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b267724fee08a58510843928259e1ae48dc2ada4

Citations in the corpus

• Experiments in economics: External validity and the robustness of phenomena (2005, neutral): “Since the story of the FCC experiments has already been told elsewhere, we shall not repeat it here (cf. Plott 1997; Guala 2001, 2005; Klemperer 2004).”
• Theoretical perspectives on resource tax design (2009, neutral): “Such structuring may also help overcome what may have been a significant obstacle to the use of auctions in many developing countries (they remain particularly rare in relation to minerals): the possibility that bonus bids will be 42 Klemperer (2004).”
• Assessing the Performance of Conservation Auctions: An Experimental Study (2007, neutral): “These included, to name but a few, the distribution of information (private-value versus common-value auctions), auction format (sealed-bid versus open call), and payment format (first-price versus second-price) (Klemperer 1999, 2002, 2004; Milgrom 1989).”
• Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions (2016, neutral): “For instance, Abrantes-Metz et al. (2012) 3In auction design, collusion is generally regarded as a first order concern (Klemperer, 2004) and has received substantial attention from the theoretical literature.”
• Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending (2009, neutral): “control variable reflecting usage of the auction mechanism on Prosper as this may significantly influence price determination ( Klemperer, 2004 ).”
• Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services (2008, neutral): “A PES contract procurement auction is a process through which a buyer of environmental services invites bids (tenders) from suppliers of environmental services for a specified contract and then buys the contracts with the lowest bids (for a non-technical introduction to auction theory, see Klempere”
• Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions (2009, neutral): “See Paul Klemperer (1999, 2004), Vijay Krishna (2002), Milgrom (2004), and Menezes and Monteiro (2005) for syntheses of a large fraction of the auction literature.”