Marktform und Gleichgewicht

By H. Stackelberg, W. Engels. 1935

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Citations in the corpus

Continual Learning of Control Primitives: Skill Discovery via Reset-Games (2020, background): “This form of sequential game is known as a Stackelberg game [49], and is closely connected to the field of bi-level optimization [10].”
A survey on networking games in telecommunications (2006, background): “In the basic Stackelberg framework, the users and the manager have utility functions, J i and R, respectively, that map from R to R [83].”
Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies (2004, background): “This situation arises in the t am gamesinvestigated by von Stengel and Koller (1997). These are games of k + 1 players where player I plays against the remaining k players which form a team because they receive identical payoffs, which are the negative of the payoffs to player I.”
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy (2005, background): “routing, after a concept from noncooperative game theory called Stackelberg games [83].”
Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments (2007, background): “Only recently (an early exception is von Stackelberg, 1934) the issue of leadership has received attention in the economics literature.”
Nash Equilibria for the Multiobjective Control of Linear Partial Differential Equations (2002, background): “1 Generalities If we define V as the Hilbert space V = U1×U2 equipped with the scalar product ((u1, u2) , (v1, v2))V = ∫ ω1×(0,T ) u1v1dxdt + ∫ ω2×(0,T ) u2v2dxdt, then we claim that the linear system (1) is a particular case of finding u ∈ V , such that a(u, v) = L(v), ∀ v ∈ V, (3) where a : V × V ”
Stackelberg–Nash exact controllability for linear and semilinear parabolic equations (2015, methodology): “Thus, let us mention the noncooperative optimization strategy proposed by Nash [16], the Pareto cooperative strategy [17] and the Stackelberg hierarchical-cooperative strategy [21].”
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games (2009, background): “Stackelberg games were introduced to study duopoly competition [16], and are now widely used to model leadership and commitment.”
Supplier- and buyer-driven channels in a two-stage supply chain (2002, background): “models arise when either the supplier or buyer has dominant bargaining power in the supply channel, similar to the economics literature where a dominant (or leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (or follower) firm moves second (Gibbons [1], Stackelberg [ 2 ]).”
Stackelberg scheduling strategies (2001, background): “6] for an introduction and [35] for their origin) and have been previously studied in the contexts of both competitive facility location [28] and networking [10, 11, 13, 17].”
The Evolutionary Foundations of Preferences (2011, background): “The observation that commitments can be valuable has a long history, beginning with Stackelberg ([142], translated into English in Peacock [96]) and playing a prominent role in Schelling [124].”