Stackelberg scheduling strategies

By Tim Roughgarden. Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2001

356 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dc52cc129726722d62efe4bc52ddb082e83c4ad0

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Management Information Systems

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology (2002, background): “More recently, Roughgarden and Tardos [19] extended these results to a broader class of games (that need not take place in a network); Roughgarden [17] examined the inefficiency of Stackelberg (rather than Nash) equilibria when one player is a network manager wishing to optimize network performance;”
Network games (2004, background): “There has been considerable progress on questions arising from this perspective for many problems including routing [29, 31], load balancing [4, 6, 25, 30, 32],”
On selfish routing in Internet-like environments (2003, background): “Roughgarden shows that it i s NPhard to compute the optimal strategy for “centrally controlled” traffic ( i.e., a Stackelberg strategy), and gives a simple algorithm to approximate the optimal strategy in a network of parallel links with total latency no more than a constant times that of the minimu”
A few good agents: multi-agent social learning (2008, background): “The work that is probably the closest to our approach is the Stackelberg strategy [21] in which a set of (market) leaders make moves first, inducing desired responding actions from the followers.”
The price of stability for network design with fair cost allocation (2004, background): “We discuss connections to the class of potential games defined by Monderer and Shapley, and extend our results to cases in which users are seeking to balance network design costs with latencies in the constructed network, with stronger results when the network has only delays and no construction…”
Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games (2009, methodology): “Stackelberg games have also been applied to resource allocation in a computer job scheduling domain [13].”
Selfish routing and the price of anarchy (2005, background): “Here we follow Roughgarden [69] and seek worst-case bounds on the ratio between the cost of the best flow possible with Stackelberg routing and that of an optimal flow.”