Leadership with commitment to mixed strategies

172 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Computing optimal randomized resource allocations for massive security games (2009, background): “In addition, the leader can often induce the favorable strong equilibrium by selecting a strategy arbitrarily close to the equilibrium that causes the the follower to strictly prefer the desired strategy [17].”
From physical security to cybersecurity (2015, background): “The assumption that the follower will always break ties in favor of the leader in cases of indifference is reasonable because in most cases the leader can induce the favorable strong equilibrium by selecting a strategy arbitrarily close to the equilibrium that causes the follower to strictly prefer ”
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to (2006, background): “[20]), although some work has investigated what can happen in the other subgame perfect equilibria [26].”